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B O O K R E V I E W S 
Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Autonomy, and Authority in Belief, by 
Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 279 
pages. $45.00 (hardcover). 
CHRIS D R A G O S , University of Toronto 
The claim that there are legitimate epistemic authorities w i l l set off alarm 
bells for many, and if it does not, the claim that there are legitimate moral 
and religious epistemic authorities in particular w i l l l ikely do the trick. 
L inda Zagzebski makes both claims i n her monograph Epistemic Authority.^ 
A n epistemic authority for me is, roughly, someone whose belief regarding 
p I adopt because I trust her capacity to arrive at the correct verdict regard¬
ing p more than I trust my own capacity to do so. These claims concerning 
authority are notably stronger than the claim some philosophers make, 
including Zagzebski, that another's belief that p provides credibility for p 
independently of my other reasons for p or for the reliability of that other 
believer. 2 To support the former, more advanced claims about authority 
and also, intermediately, the claim for the prima facie credibility of others' 
beliefs, Zagzebski retreats to construct what is, I think, the most robust ac¬
count of self-trust yet offered. It is on this notion that her account rests. In 
this review, I present the core of that account (chaps. 2, 3, and 5) and when 
necessary 1 touch on other parts of her book. 1 pose two criticisms, the first 
quite minor while the second calls for a clarification of an important cog 
in Zagzebski's larger argument. I conclude by identifying what I see as the 
greatest strength and the importance of the book. 
Epistemic Authority is very readable, even though the strong bur¬
den of proof it assumes calls for systematic argumentation. Like other 
^Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief (Oxford: Oxford 
Universi ty Press, 2012). 
2 For an extensive list of proponents of this claim, or of a close analogue, see Jennifer 
Lackey, "Testimony: Acqu i r i ng Knowledge f rom Others," in Social Epistemology: Essential 
Readings, ed. A . Goldman and D . Whitcomb (Oxford: Oxford Universi ty Press, 2011), 86, 
note 9. Note that I say another's belief and not testimony. Zagzebski suggests important dif¬
ferences between the two (chap. 6) whi le others do not. Unfortunately, I have not the space 
to discuss this issue. 
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monographs on trust and testimony, this book begins with its contextu-
alization within the history of philosophy and contemporary literature. 3 
In chapter 1, Zagzebski tells us how epistemic trust in others and in 
authority is thought to conflict wi th individual autonomy interpreted as 
self-reliance—that is, one's strict reliance on one's own faculties for acquir-
ing appropriate psychic states.4 But unlike other philosophers who also 
argue for some form of reasonable trust in others, Zagzebski does not 
try to downplay the tension between trust and autonomy. Instead, she 
proposes an alternate understanding of autonomy rooted in a primitive, 
inescapable notion of self-trust (chap. 2) which also grounds her account 
of authority.5 The result, Zagzebski thinks, is that autonomy sits in a posi¬
tive relationship with the practice of trusting others (chap. 3), and even 
authorities (chap. 5), including communal (chap. 7), moral (chap. 8), and 
religious (chap. 9) authorities. A s for the remaining chapters, I touch on 
chapter 4 when concluding this review, though space does not allow me to 
3 For example, see Richard Foley, Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others (New York: C a m -
bridge Universi ty Press, 2001), chap. 1; and see C. A . J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), chap. 1. Coady also engages in more thorough analysis of 
historical figures in part 11 of his book. 
4 The self-reliant agent w o u l d accept the slogan of the Royal Society of London, "nullius 
in verba," which roughly means, "'take nobody's word for it," though of course she w o u l d 
accept the saying only as a result of her isolated inquiry and not at the word of the Royal 
Society. 
'Elizabeth Fricker, for example, though she thinks self-reliance is an impossible ideal, 
assumes the self-reliance interpretation of autonomy when she says that "[i]f I take others' 
word for things . . . by this very fact I am not epistemically autonomous" ("Testimony and 
Epistemic Autonomy," in The Epistemology of Testimony, ed. J. Lackey and E. Sosa (New York: 
Oxford Universi ty Press, 2006), 228). Fricker does speak of "self-governance" (229), wh ich 
is something that I can maintain without self-reliance, but this is not an explicit recapturing 
of autonomy; rather, it is the identification of a good that can be salvaged in the situation 
we find ourselves in: "there is still an important loss of autonomy" (240). Similarly, Richard 
Foley's notion of "self-monitoring" touches on some of Zagzebski's concerns, but he ulti¬
mately thinks that our efforts to maintain autonomy consist in our striving for the difficult 
balance between trusting others and "intellectual independence," as if there is at least some 
deep tension between the two (Intellectual Trust, 129). 
Beside this point, it is worth noting that, unlike other philosophers, Zagzebski does not 
interpret major figures throughout the history of philosophy as advocating for self-reliance. 
Given the conciseness of her reinterpretations of Plato, Descartes, Locke, and Hume , her 
arguments that these figures d id not endorse self-reliance in the strong form presented are 
quite impressive. A n example of an opposing interpretation is Coady (14). H e argues against 
the idea of the "autonomous knower," w h o is roughly identical to the self-reliant agent, 
after he proposes that the idea is attributable to Plato and taken up by post-Renaissance 
philosophers, such as Locke. Elizabeth Fricker endorses Coady's reading of Locke ("Tell¬
ing and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-Reduct ionism in the Epistemology of Testimony," 
Mind 104 (1995), 394) and claims independently that both Descartes and Locke endorsed self-
reliance ("Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy," 225). Similar interpretations of the tradition 
can be found in Loraine Code, What Can She Know: Feminist Theory and the Construction of 
Knowledge (Ithaca, N Y : Cornel l Universi ty Press, 1991), 111, and in Foley (Intellectual Trust, 
chap. 1, chap. 4). 
So there are two notable overarching differences between Zagzebski's account and the 
relevant epistemological literature. The first is that Zagzebski aims to recapture the notion 
of autonomy whi le others do not; instead, those others try to downplay the tension between 
trust and autonomy (interpreted as self-reliance). The second is that Zagzebski does not situ¬
ate her account in direct opposition to much of the philosophical tradition, whi le others do. 
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discuss chapters 6 and 10. These two chapters are siblings in the sense that 
they are Zagzebski's forays into ongoing debates in epistemology: testi¬
mony and disagreement, respectively. Chapter 11, the last chapter, returns 
full-circle to discuss autonomy directly, in light of the contents of the book. 
The foundation of Zagzebski's account is laid in chapter 2, where she 
presents her basic notion of self-trust. We are first given an informal theory 
of the psyche somewhat resembling Keith Lehrer's account.6 Zagzebski 
describes our basic psychic operation at both the pre-reflective and reflec-
tive levels as, first, seeking the resolution of dissonance between our psychic 
states—e.g., beliefs, desires, emotions, attitudes—and, second, as fitting 
our psychic states to their perceived objects, which we take to be external 
to us: we seek to fit our desires to the desirable, our emotion-dispositions 
to the appropriate circumstances, our beliefs to the truth, and so on. This 
latter part of our psychic operation shows that we possess a natural trust 
in our faculties. That is, for the many types of psychic states we possess, we 
trust that the products of our faculties fit their perceived objects (36). For 
the purposes of this book, a particularly important instance of the general 
relation between psychic states and their fitting correctly to their perceived 
objects is the relation between belief and truth. 7 We pre-reflectively trust 
the products of our epistemic faculties, but there remains the question of 
whether this trust is reasonable after the test of self-reflection. Zagzebski 
thinks it is, since it survives worries f rom epistemic circularity—that is, 
the ultimately question-begging bases of arguments for the reliability 
of our epistemic faculties. Since reflective trust in our faculties survives 
grounding worries, we can infer that if we employ our reflective faculties 
as best we can, we are most trustworthy. Zagzebski calls this state epistemic 
conscientiousness: aiming at the truth with the fullest conscious exercise of 
our powers (48). 
In chapter 3, Zagzebski extends her argument for epistemic self-trust to 
trust i n the epistemic faculties of others. Since I trust myself for arriving 
at beliefs, and since I see that others are relevantly like me, I trust others' 
faculties for arriving at beliefs. This grants me a defeasible prima facie rea¬
son to believe p if another believes p, and this reason is taken into account 
alongside any other reasons I may have for or against p. Further, if I con¬
scientiously believe another is conscientious in accepting p, then I have a 
6See Kei th Lehrer, Self-Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge, and Autonomy (Oxford: Oxford 
Universi ty Press, 1997). 
7 Zagzebski is careful not to rely on strong objectivist readings of the "fi t" of psychic states 
to their objects (33-34). For example, the particular epistemic case of fitting our beliefs to 
their objects, what Zagzebski calls our "natural desire for truth," need only mean something 
as minimal as wanting to know the answers to our questions or how something works, w i th 
a natural presumption that not any arbitrary answer w i l l do but that there are right answers 
(34-35). If even this seems troublesome for some, they should note that Zagzebski is claiming 
only that there is a natural desire for truth; there remains the possibility that one can reflect 
upon and react to this desire. The skeptic and the postmodern critic of objectivist notions of 
truth, for example, need not deny that their reasoning is in response to the natural desire for 
truth (35). 
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stronger prima facie reason for accepting p (68). The account becomes more 
controversial in chapter 5, where Zagzebski argues for the much stronger 
claim that it can be reasonable for me to accept an authority's belief p as a 
pre-emption of my own reasons for p, not as a (perhaps quite strong) prima 
facie reason to be considered alongside (for or against) my other reasons. I 
return to this pre-emption thesis below. 
Given that authority and autonomy are commonly considered to be 
in tension essentially, even her most skeptical readers must appreciate 
Zagzebski's proposal that my own autonomy—by way of my conscien¬
tiousness—is the basis of epistemic authority. Her basic rationale for this is 
that if my goal is to acquire the truth about p, and if I conscientiously judge 
that another is better than me in the domain relevant for p, then it can be 
the case that I should adopt that other's belief regarding p.8 The case of 
authority is extended in chapters 7 through 9 to argue for reasonable trust 
in corporate, moral, and religious authority, respectively. These chapters 
contain independently interesting arguments and relevant asymmetries 
to the general argument, though most I do not discuss due to lack of space. 
1t must be noted, however, that Zagzebski is working wi th little precedent, 
even among those who argue for the reasonableness of trust in others and 
in certain experts, for treating any subset of religious, moral, political, and 
aesthetic figures as authorities or for treating even claims in these domains 
as the sorts of claims that can be taken on trust. Richard Foley (2001), for 
example, offers a generous account of intellectual self-trust and trust in 
others, including in some experts, but he argues that prima facie trust in 
moral and aesthetic matters should not be granted because there are no 
corresponding truths to the claims offered in these domains (115-116). 
Comments throughout his book suggest he thinks religious claims should 
be likewise circumscribed (e.g., 122-123). 
Also in chapter 9, Zagzebski constructs an argument that I wish to 
briefly address (185-188). 1t builds upon a claim she makes in chapter 3, 
which is that if I have a presumption in favour of the trustworthiness of 
others' faculties, then consensus about a belief p adds credibility to p for 
me (70). From here, Zagzebski provides her version of the consensus gen¬
tium argument: If I have a presumption of trust in others, and if I learn 
8 I say "can be the case" because several mitigating factors prevent the proliferation of del¬
egating my beliefs to the greatest authority in every domain. First, besides my goal of fitting 
my beliefs to the truth, 1 must also appease m y coherentist-style psychic goal of fitting my 
psychic states w i th each other—i.e., achieving a harmonious psychic self by resolving disso¬
nance and maintaining that harmony (110-111; 112-113, 117). If I conscientiously judge that 
resolving dissonance wi th in m y psyche in favour of an authority's belief w i l l be more costly 
than resolving it in favour of everything in m y psyche wi th which it conflicts, then 1 need not 
accept that authority's belief. 1t is often the case that a very smart and qualified person tells 
me something that 1 inevitably trust less than 1 trust all the things that conflict wi th what she 
tells me. A second mitigating scenario is when I judge that another is more trustworthy than 
I am in some domain, but also that it is still unl ikely that they w i l l get the truth. There is no 
imperative to accept the authority's belief in this case, since an important end for me is truth 
(111). Third , if there is disagreement between authorities, I may be able to abstain. Zagzebski 
discusses disagreement of this sort and others in chapter 10. 
BOOK REVIEWS 215 
that the vast majority of others believe i n God, then the "epistemic pre-
sumption is in favour of the belief [in God]" (2012, 186). More precisely, 
by sheer numbers, the argument f rom consensus for the presumption 
of atheism or agnosticism is much weaker than the argument f rom con¬
sensus for the presumption of theism (186-187).9 It seems, however, that 
Zagzebski is making the global case for the presumption of theism at the 
expense of many local cases for the presumption of atheism or agnosti¬
cism. She argues in chapter 7, as wel l as in places throughout chapters 8 
and 9, that one's community can operate as a very strong form of authority 
over oneself. But if in my community belief in theism is not shared by 
most members (or whatever the threshold should be), my community's 
authority does not provide me with a presumption in favour of theism, or 
if i n my community belief in atheism is shared by most members, my com¬
munity's authority provides me with a presumption i n favour of atheism. 
Zagzebski's claim that communal authority is much stronger (chap. 7) 
compounds the issue and very plausibly trumps the global presumption 
of theism for those belonging to these communities. So the wider commu¬
nity of scientists, for example, provides its members wi th a presumption 
in favour of atheism, as do most narrowly defined scientific communi¬
ties for their members (e.g., biologists, chemists). I presume the same is 
true of the general philosophical community and probably for most of 
its sub-communities (besides the philosophy of religion and maybe some 
other areas). The same is the case for many other communities, perhaps 
even by accidental consensus in many situations (e.g., a hunting club 
that happens to be populated mostly by agnostics or atheists).10 I imagine 
Zagzebski would simply grant this consequence. She might also point out 
that it is likely that there are many more communities the authorities of 
which provide their members wi th a presumption of theism than there are 
communities that do not or that provide their members with a presump¬
tion of atheism. I still think this result should be noted as a corollary to 
Zagzebski's version of the consensus gentium argument. 
What I think is closer to a genuine shortcoming lies elsewhere. Zagzebski 
takes epistemic authority to essentially possess a "normative power that 
generates reasons for others to do or to believe something pre-emptively" 
(102). That an authority's belief pre-empts my own reasons for that belief 
is a key claim in the book and one that 1 think w i l l garner some attention. 
It seems that the pre-emption thesis relies heavily on the import of a cer¬
tain distinction Zagzebski draws in chapter 3 between third-person (i.e., 
theoretical) reasons and first-person (i.e., deliberative) reasons. O n the one 
9 Zagzebski points out that since this argument stems f rom self-trust, it is not an argument 
to the best explanation and so is in this way unlike Seneca's and Cicero's init ial formulations 
of the argument (187). 
101s there a difference for Zagzebski between accidental consensus of this sort and consen-
sus more closely tied to the defining characteristics of the group (e.g., belief in the 1mmacu-
late Conception among Catholics as opposed to a hunting club that happens to be populated 
mostly by agnostics)? 
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hand, there is mind-independent evidence (third-person, theoretical rea¬
sons) that anyone can adopt as reasons for belief; the connection between 
these reasons and the truth does not depend upon their adoption. O n the 
other hand, there are mind-dependent reasons that only the bearer can 
possess; they connect the bearer to the truth (64). For example, the fact that 
I had an experience is a third-person piece of evidence that anyone can take 
as a reason for some belief, but only I had the experience, and it affects my 
psychic states, reasoning processes, and beliefs and so serves as a reason 
only for me (64). Intuitions and emotions are other examples of irreducibly 
first-personal reasons: they are necessarily possessed and they are affective 
for my psychic states, including beliefs (65). Since I take beliefs to be true 
ultimately on the basis of trust, and since my trust is mine necessarily, trust 
is a deliberative reason as well, including my trust in others, as mentioned 
earlier (65). 
Zagzebski then adds that since "no one has figured out how to combine" 
or "aggregate" the two types of reasons "to give a summary verdict," they 
do not aggregate (66). The no-aggregation stipulation is important for de¬
fending the proposal in chapter 5 that when I identify an authority's belief 
p, it pre-empts my reasons for p instead of simply being taken into account 
alongside my reasons for p: my trust in that authority is deliberative and 
so purportedly w i l l not aggregate with my other reasons (114).11 The dis¬
tinction is also relevant in the discussion of disagreement (chap. 10), and 
elsewhere as well , roughly as a buttress against noted theoretical evidence 
that conflicts wi th my deliberative reasons. Last, the distinction is relevant 
for the more general claim i n chapter 3 that others' beliefs have prima facie 
credibility for me, since the trust in which this credibility is based is a first-
person, deliberative reason for me to accept p. I think it is unfortunate, then, 
that the no-aggregation stipulation is rather underdeveloped. 
In several places in the book, deliberative and theoretical reasons interact 
in notable ways, and most of these interactions are clearly not aggregative. 
For example, Zagzebski tells us that my trust in others, which gives me 
deliberative prima facie reasons to accept what others believe, is defeasible. 
That theoretical reasons can defeat deliberative reasons does not require 
that they can aggregate. So far so good. But Zagzebski also claims that prima 
facie credibility via trust, which is a deliberative reason, "can affect the bal¬
ance of total reasons" for a belief, which I presume includes both kinds of 
reasons (69). This seems to be something like an aggregative relationship, a 
relationship seemingly different f rom the one required for thinking about 
epistemic authority as a "normative power that generates reasons for others 
to do or to believe something pre-emptively" (102). That different (and less 
controversial) way of thinking about epistemic authority is this: the im¬
port of the deliberative reason that is an authority's belief stands alongside 
(for or against) my other reasons, which are theoretical. We saw that the 
1 1Deliberative reasons do not cause me to give up my other reasons, but Zagzebski thinks 
I do act on them completely independently of m y other reasons (113). 
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no-aggregation stipulation disallows this. But we need to know why prima 
facie trust, which is a deliberative reason, seemingly aggregates with my 
theoretical reasons in the way suggested above (69). W h y is this form of 
aggregation between deliberative and theoretical reasons acceptable while 
the alternate definition of epistemic authority is not? The only real defense 
of the no-aggregation stipulation we are given is that deliberative reasons 
are irreducibly first-personal. But this does not imply that the two sorts of 
reasons cannot in some way aggregate, and neither does the fact that "no 
one has figured out" a precise relational metric. This latter point concerns 
only the status of our theorizing about the nature of reasons and so does 
not imply the no-aggregation stipulation. 
Zagzebski does refer us (63, note 9) to a separate paper of hers in which 
she also addresses the distinction between theoretical and deliberative 
reasons.1 2 Even if some clarifying details are found there, more is called 
for in this monograph. That said, to this end, few more helpful details 
are in fact found in that paper, even though the distinction is more thor¬
oughly unpacked there. In that paper, Zagzebski says much of the same 
about deliberative and theoretical reasons, the difference there being that 
she is most interested in the import of the distinction for issues in reli¬
gious epistemology. 1 3 She again says of first and third person reasons that 
"[t]ogether they can increase or decrease my confidence that p" (291), 
which again seems like an aggregative relationship. But an unpacking of 
the no-aggregation stipulation is not found in that paper. 
Perhaps the reason that Zagzebski does not spend time to defend the no-
aggregation stipulation thoroughly is that she is not worried so much about 
arguing for the superiority of the pre-emption thesis over the alternate 
view, according to which the weight of an authority's belief is considered 
alongside my own reasons. Instead, Zagzebski commences wi th a defini¬
tion of epistemic authority as essentially having a "normative power that 
generates reasons for others to do or to believe something pre-emptively" 
(102), from here arguing that her account best defends epistemic authority 
in this sense. 1 grant that her account likely does a better job of defending 
epistemic authority, so defined, than do other accounts in the literature, 
but more attention could be given to the preference of this definition of 
epistemic authority over the alternative(s). 
I have suggested two motivations for Zagzebski to defend the no-
aggregation stipulation. One is to clarify the seemingly aggregative rela¬
tionship between prima facie trust and my theoretical reasons. Another is to 
show that her definition of epistemic authority is preferable. Here is a third 
motivation: to avoid an odd consequence that seems to arise without the 
1 2 "First Person and Third Person Reasons and Religious Epistemology," European Journal 
for Philosophy of Religion 3 (2011), 285-304. 
1 3 For example, Zagzebski again says that first and third person reasons "cannot aggregate 
because nobody has figured out how to put the first person and third person points of view 
together" (290-291). 1s putting the two views together—a seemingly impossible feat—neces¬
sary for aggregation? 
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no-aggregation stipulation. Put another way, noting this odd consequence 
may motivate one toward the no-aggregation stipulation. Zagzebski 
claims that any psychic state in myself can be a deliberative reason for me 
to believe p, including my states of believing (65). Consider the case where 
I come to believe p conscientiously but have not reflected on my conscien¬
tiousness and so have not formed the belief that I conscientiously arrived 
at belief p. 1f 1 then reflect on my conscientiousness in coming to believe 
p (perhaps prompted by reading Zagzebski's book) and form the belief 
that I conscientiously came to believe p, then I now have an additional 
deliberative reason to accept p: my trust in my conscientiousness. But is 
there a regress problem here if we remove the no-aggregation stipulation? 
M y conscientiously believing p is a deliberative reason to believe p once 
I am aware of and trust my conscientiousness in arriving at p. But if I 
then become aware that I was conscientious in my determination that I 
was conscientious in coming to believe p, and if I trust that higher-level 
conscientiousness, my deliberative reason for believing p is stronger. This 
can continue onward and upward. Without the claim that deliberative and 
theoretical reasons do not aggregate, it seems possible to move from rela¬
tively low confidence in the truth of p, after coming to possess some less 
than fu l ly convincing theoretical evidence for p, to a high confidence in p 
after 1 count the weight of my trusting my conscientiousness (at regressing 
levels) in arriving at p. 
One reaction to this odd consequence, short of accepting the no-
aggregation stipulation, is to agree that each meta-belief provides more 
support for p, but to point out that our limited minds only allow us to go so 
far in this process—far less than to infinity. Thus, the regress is not vicious. 
But it is not very difficult to imagine a being with perfect retention powers 
who is less than omniscient and so in the possession of some beliefs in 
which that being is not fu l ly confident. We can run the exercise for that 
being to the point that these beliefs are possessed in greater confidence. Of 
course, the other possible reaction is to accept the no-aggregation stipula¬
tion, but the point is that it could use a more robust defence than what 
Zagzebski offers. 
A l l this said, I am by and large impressed with Zagzebski's mono¬
graph. I close wi th what I think its greatest strength: the tremendous 
scope of her account. Though Zagzebski is most interested in trust in our 
epistemic faculties, trust in the relation between belief and truth is only a 
token of the more general relation between our psychic faculties and the 
correctness of fit wi th their perceived objects (75). Self-trust is intended 
to serve as a sufficient basis for arguments for trust in our non-epistemic 
faculties as wel l as our epistemic faculties. For example, Zagzebski argues 
in chapter 4 for trust in our desires and emotion-dispositions, as well as 
in those of others, and the argument is roughly analogous to the argu¬
ment for epistemic self-trust and trust in others given in chapters 2 and 
3. The idea that there is significant overlap between our epistemic and 
non-epistemic selves w i l l deeply resonate wi th many readers. Zagzebski's 
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general notion of self-trust seems to me the strongest candidate to date 
in support of treating our non-epistemic selves—e.g., desires, attitudes, 
emotions (particularly admiration), etc.—in roughly parallel fashion to 
our epistemic selves, and this approach culminates in particularly impres¬
sive fashion in making sense of the complex character of communities and 
traditions (chaps. 7-9). Scope and unification are two important virtues of 
systematic accounts and I think even Zagzebski's most staunch critics w i l l 
appreciate their exemplification in her self-trust-based theory. She laments 
at the outset of her monograph that "rarely we do get . . . any attempt 
to connect epistemic authority wi th the literature on authority in moral 
and political philosophy" (1). Her book is an impressive response to that 
lament, starting f rom the ground up, f rom trust to authority. The scope of 
Zagzebski's account unifies the issues addressed in her book wi th diverse 
philosophical literature, and of course wi th several ongoing debates in 
epistemology. Epistemic Authority w i l l be of interest to a broad readership, 
including moral philosophers and social and political philosophers. It is 
also essential reading for any epistemologist interested in trust, testimony, 
or any topic fall ing under the label "social epistemology." 
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The turn to narrative in accounts of practical identity has been contro¬
versial. The claim that narrative is central to the intelligibility of human 
lives—found in such thinkers as MacIntyre, Ricoeur and Schechtman— 
has generated great interest but faced numerous objections. For instance: 
Does the narrative identity approach confuse stories wi th their subjects? 
Does it construe "narrative" too strongly, smuggling literary properties 
into human lives in misleading ways, or does it construe "narrative" so 
weakly that its claims become trivial? Alongside this general debate, there 
has been a parallel discussion in Kierkegaard studies. Several essays in 
Davenport and Rudd's edited collection Kierkegaard After MacIntyre (2001) 
advanced a view that Kierkegaard is himself committed to a view of "nar¬
rative unity" importantly similar to MacIntyre's, and that Kierkegaard's 
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